Legislators are given the task of dividing a fixed budget (a version of "divide the dollar"), and their utility is defined strictly over the share that they receive. In each stage of the game, a division is proposed, amendments are made (in the case of an open rule), and members vote. If the proposal passes, the game ends; if not, then play continues for another round, and a new division, discounted by δ, is proposed, and play repeats. Under a closed rule, outcomes are typically minimal winning coalition; under an open rule, benefits are distributed more widely.
For our purposes, though, equilibrium predictions about how many districts benefit are less interesting than which districts benefit. And in this respect, the key feature of the model is the power of recognition: the legislator with proposal power offers a bill that a majority of legislators will support, but one that includes an extra helping for his own constituency.
Most representations of the model assume that legislators are recognized randomly and thus have equal probabilities of being selected as the proposer. Consequentially, bill by bill, outcomes vary widely across districts, with the proposer obtaining more than other members of the coalition, and those members excluded from the coalition receiving nothing at all. Under a closed rule the equilibrium outcome, which occurs in the first stage of the game, yields 1 -[δ(n -1)/2n] for the proposer, δn for other members of the coalition, and nothing for the remaining (n -1)/2 members outside of the coalition. Because proposers are recognized randomly, however, in expectation districts receive a roughly equal share of federal benefits. In this sense, the core distributive predictions of Baron and Ferejohn have more than a passing resemblance to those of traditional theories of universalism (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast 1979 Weingast , 1989 Niou and Ordeshook 1991) . 1 Strictly speaking, their model does not require that proposers be randomly selected. Indeed, Baron and Ferejohn note that those members with a higher probability of being recognized are less likely to join coalitions for the simple reason that they have a higher continuation value in the game (1989, 1189) .
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The theoretical literature that builds upon Baron and Ferejohn underscores Yildirim (2007, 168) summarizes, "A key prediction of this literature is the presence of the 'proposer power' in that the agent who proposes how to allocate the surplus receives a disproportionate share. Thus, understanding how the proposal power is gained and distributed among negotiating parties is crucial in understanding the allocation of surplus, and the parties' payoffs." Who, within Congress, is well positioned to secure a larger share of federal outlays?
More specifically, how do members' partisan affiliations and/or institutional posts affect their chances of serving as the proposer, and hence being capable of exploiting the legislative process for their own district's gain? The empirical literature on the U.S. Congress offers a variety of answers to both of these questions.
Empirical Evidence on the Sources of Proposal Power
Congressional scholars are keenly aware of the inequalities in agenda power among legislators. Though the literature identifies many different sources of proposal power, we focus on the two most prevalent: committees and parties. As McCarty's (2000, 509) extension of the Baron and Ferejohn model summarizes, "rules and norms may provide greater opportunities for leaders of committees and parties to make proposals than other members." Because parties act as cartels to dominate committee actions (Cox and McCubbins 1993) , one might view these as distinct proposers or a single set.
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Committees are perhaps the best defined institutional feature of the modern Congress, and legislators' careers are frequently defined by their committee work. It is widely believed that legislators seek committee assignments that allow them to serve their districts' interests, and that logrolls on the floor improve the odds that committee proposals succeed (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Deering and Smith 1997; Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1981, 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988) . Consequentially, in the aggregate we should expect members of key committees or chairs of any committee to receive more benefits. With specific jurisdictions, members of committees also should secure more benefits in the policy domains they oversee.
Empirically, though, the evidence for committee influence over distributive benefits remains surprisingly mixed. Ferejohn's (1974) important book on the Army Corps of Engineers' projects, for instance, demonstrates that members of the Appropriations and Public Works committees directed funds to their districts quite clearly, but that analysis is now over 30 years old. More recently, Alvarez and Saving (1997) show that districts represented by members on Armed Services or Small Business receive more funds devoted to their policy jurisdiction, but those on Appropriations and Public Works do not. Heitshusen (2001) finds that members on the Agriculture Committee secure more agriculture spending, but that members on the Education and Labor Committee fail to direct more for education or labor spending to their home districts. Rich (1989) finds that serving on Appropriations, Banking, and relevant subcommittees had only minimal effect on HUD spending by district. In his study of bargaining over a transportation bill, Lauderdale (2008) finds that being a member of Transportation Committee increases district earmarks on the initial House bill but not the final legislation. In contrast, Knight's (2005) study of transportation spending reveals large and consistent effects of committee membership on transportation project spending in one's district, although service on Appropriations of the 7 Surface Transportation Subcommittee does not. Finally, Evans (2004) finds that being on Public Works increases the likelihood of district demonstration project in three of four models, but being on Ways and Means or its Trade Subcommittee had no effect on whether districts received particular benefits from the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Though their findings vary, these studies confront a common set of challenges. Indeed, it is largely because of data limitations that the literature does not speak with one voice about the ability of committee members and leaders to wield proposal power. Most of the analyses examine only one or a few committees, tend to focus on earmarks or other small projects, and seldom track patterns for more than a year or two. Because recent work has challenged the notion that self-selection by legislators causes "high demand" districts to be overrepresented on committees (Frisch and Kelly 2006; Krehbiel 1991 Krehbiel , 1994 , more scrutiny of the impact of committee assignments on district benefits is in order.
A second and equally substantial body of work scrutinizes the ways in which the majority party dominates congressional proceedings, and thereby secures larger shares of government outlays (Aldrich 1995; Binder 1997; Rohde 1991) . Majority party leaders, it is postulated, favor their own members to help them win reelection-both directly and indirectly through the party brand-in exchange for support of the party's legislative program. The prominent "cartel" model McCubbins 2005, 2007) further posits that the majority party acts collectively to control the agenda. If true, members of the majority party should profit handsomely from their privileged positions within Congress and proposal powers. As one recent study summarizes, "majority party legislators should be expected to discriminate against districts represented by the minority party when allocating pork" (Balla et al. 2002) .
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A number of scholars have investigated the impact of majority party status on congressional outputs. Unfortunately, most of these studies consider short time frames during which majority party control does not change. Levitt and Snyder (1995) , for example, examine a six-year period in the late 1980s and find that more spending goes to districts where the Democratic share of the presidential vote is higher and where the incumbent legislator is a Democrat. Because the Democrats controlled the House throughout this period, however, it is impossible to infer whether a change in party control would actually alter spending patterns. Balla et al. (2002) offer a blame avoidance model of distributive politics to explain earmarks for higher education. They present evidence that majority party members, all Democrats, are in fact more likely to secure earmarks, which also tend to be larger in size. They do not show whether this is true beyond the eight year period of Democratic control they examine or in other policy domains. Martin (2003) similarly finds that Republican enclaves receive less federal money, but because Democrats controlled the House during the entire period of his study, we again cannot determine if it is party differences per se or the effect of majority party status that causes this difference.
These limitations characterize other work as well. Lowry and Potoski (2004) , for instance, find scant evidence across seven different policy domains that the majority party gives more to districts represented by its members, but their conclusions are limited to a seven-year period in the Senate. Evans' (1994) analysis of pork barrel politics is also restricted to a few pieces of legislation, and she reveals little evidence of majority party control of district project awards. Bickers and Stein (2000) use the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 as a natural experiment to determine how party control affects distributive spending. Beyond the fact that Republicans looked more favorably on contingent liability programs than did their Democratic 9 predecessors, Bickers and Stein observe no real effects of partisan or other political variables on spending. Finally, Lauderdale (2008) shows that earmarks in the 2005 transportation bill favored Democratic districts; but again, with only a single year of data Lauderdale cannot distinguish partisan differences from majority party influences.
Being in the majority party clearly comes with benefits. An extensive body of research analyzes the effects of party membership on things such as roll call votes, agenda control, committee assignments, and campaign fundraising (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox and Magar 1999; McCubbins 2005, 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001; Smith 2000) . Much less is known, however, about how majority party status affects the distribution of federal funds. Even the few studies that tackle this question directly are hampered by data limitations that prevent them from drawing broad conclusions. Most commonly, these studies focus on a single policy domain over a short period of time, wherein partisanship and party control correlate perfectly. Consequentially, we often cannot neither whether their results apply in other policy domains, or whether they indicate the effects of majority party status, per se, or simply membership in one party or another.
The President Is the Proposer
Committees and parties may strengthen the bargaining position of certain members of Congress on particular pieces of legislation. When crafting the federal budget, however, neither committee nor party leaders fill the role of Baron and Ferejohn's proposer. In point of fact, no one within Congress does. The actual proposer inhabits the White House, a basic fact that the distributive politics literature has overlooked. Since the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the president has been responsible for composing a complete budget, which is supposed to be submitted to Congress in February of each year, and which initiates the actual authorization and appropriations processes.
Producing the president's budget is no trivial undertaking. In multiple volumes and tens of thousands of pages, the president's budget identifies funding levels not just for individual agencies, but also for individual projects and employees within these agencies. The president then supplements specific requests with extensive policy and legislative recommendations, detailed economic forecasts, and exhaustive accounts on the performance and finances of federal agencies and programs. When they ultimately get around to crafting a final budget, members of Congress rely upon the president's budget more than any other document for information about operations within the federal government (Schick 2000, 90, 189-93) .
Substantial efforts are made to ensure that the president's budget reflects his policy priorities. Rather than submit requests directly to Congress, agencies seeking federal funding must submit detailed reports to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Working at the behest of the president, OMB then clears each of these reports to ensure that they reflect the chief executive's policy priorities. When they reveal discrepancies, officials at OMB either return the reports to the agencies for subsequent amendment, or they simply edit the documents themselves.
Upon submission of the president's budget, of course, members of Congress are free to offer any number of changes. So doing, though, they must contend with an actively engaged president. Coinciding with the State of the Union speech, the release of the president's budget is typically a highly public affair, wherein the president makes his case for his most important budget priorities, and agencies follow up with press releases and briefings of their own (Schick 2000, 98) . During the actual appropriations process, the president deploys a small army of 11 experts to testify on behalf of his budget priorities. Concurrently, the president himself weighs in with direct solicitations to key members of Congress (Neustadt 1990) , public appeals (CanesWrone 2006) , and ultimately the threat of a veto (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Cameron 2000) , all in an effort to control the content of the final budget.
After an appropriation's passage, the president has still more opportunities to influence how federal funds are actually spent. Indeed, a substantial portion of the federal budget supports programs and grants that executive agencies administer. As just one illustrative example, consider the National Science Foundation's (NSF) doctoral dissertation grants. Though Congress decides how much the NSF can spend, bureaucrats within the agency decide where the money goes. And so it is with larger research grants through the National Institute of Health, disaster relief through the Federal Emergency Management Agency, financial assistance through the Small Business Administration, and so on. Bureaucrats within the executive branch, many of whom hold presidential appointments, are ultimately responsible for deciding the geographic distribution of many federal funds.
Presidents, and the department heads who work for them, also have opportunities to redirect those funds that support programs serving specific communities. Presidents can reprogram funds within certain budgetary accounts; and with Congress's approval, they can transfer funds between accounts. Contingency accounts, which are typically established for unforeseen disasters, give presidents further allowance to redirect federal funds towards their preferred projects. As a matter of course, final budgets regularly leave presidents a fair amount of discretion to influence the geographic distribution of federal funds for specific programs. For an artful president intent upon redirecting federal outlays to a preferred constituency, "the opportunity for mischief is substantial" (Fisher 1975, 88) . Just as congressional scholars have argued that the ex post power of committees enhances their influence in the policy process (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) , we contend that the president's ex post ability to influence the distribution of funds through executive agencies complements his ex ante proposal power.
Fixated on the internal workings of Congress, the preponderance of empirical studies of distributive politics has overlooked the fact that appropriations are introduced, signed, and eventually implemented in the executive branch. Recently, though, a handful of scholars have incorporated the president. A series of unpublished manuscripts have introduced evidence that presidents can target certain forms of federal spending toward specific states (Shor 2006 ) and counties (Mebane and Wawro 2002) . We extend this formative work by tracking non-defense federal spending in every congressional district over a 21-year period, the most comprehensive dataset on the geographic distribution of federal outlays ever compiled.
Who Does the President Target?
We postulate that presidents use their budgetary influence to benefit members of their own party. They do so for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, perhaps, presidents direct outlays to populations who share their political interests and priorities. More than just generic pork, many federal programs have clear political content that engenders the support of one party and opposition of the other. Democratic presidents, then, tend to support programs that benefit constituents who typically elect Democratic representatives to Congress, just as Republican presidents support programs that benefit constituents who elect Republicans.
Presidents have additional reasons for directing federal outlays to districts represented by members of their own party within Congress. For starters, presidents may wish to reward copartisans for their support on other legislative initiatives (Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004) .
Given that the political fates of co-partisans are often linked (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 13 2007) , presidents have further electoral incentives to support congressional members of their own party. And finally, presidents, as party leaders, have unique responsibilities to ensure that a preponderance of government outlays remains within the bailiwick of their own party (Galvin 2009 ).
Our main predictions concern the average difference between allocations across the parties. But we do not rule out the possibility of important interaction effects. McCarty (2000), for instance, presents one of the few studies that explicitly recognizes the president's ability to influence the geographic distribution of federal spending. Through the veto, McCarty suggests, a president can secure a disproportionate share of the federal budget for his "constituency," which, consistent with our own claims, plausibly consists of districts represented by members of his party. McCarty's model further predicts that the average difference in spending between copartisans of the president and members of the opposition party will depend upon their respective sizes. In particular, when "the president's party in the legislature is small … spending will be heavily skewed toward the president of the party" (125).
Other presidential strategies may attenuate the observed differences between members of the president's party and the opposition party. Consider, for example, standard vote-buying models of Congress (e.g. Groseclose and Snyder 1999), wherein a proposer builds a supermajority in support of a legislative initiative by paying off at least some individuals who would otherwise oppose it. In these models, the costs associated with purchasing any individual vote typically increase in the distance between a bill's location and a member's ideal point, relative to the reversion policy. As a proposer who also has ex post budgetary influence, the president may use federal outlays to engage in precisely this kind of behavior. Often the president will have to purchase the votes of some members of his own party. To build a majority or possible super-majority, though, he often must secure the additional support of at least some members of the opposition party. And where vote buying is necessary to do so, the president may choose to direct additional federal outlays to the opposition party's more moderate members, whose votes are cheaper to purchase.
Presidents, too, may use federal outlays to influence the electoral fortunes of individual members of Congress. Because they can expect to enact a greater portion of their legislative agenda when large numbers of their own party reside within Congress (Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 2000) , presidents have strong incentives to use their influence over the budgetary process in order to shore up the reelection prospects of co-partisan incumbents and the election prospects of future co-partisan challengers. By targeting congressional districts represented by co-partisans for additional federal outlays, and congressional districts represented by the opposition party for cuts, presidents may be able to influence the partisan composition of the next Congress. More exactly, presidents ought to direct a disproportionate share of federal outlays to electorally vulnerable members of their own party, and a disproportionate share of cuts to electorally vulnerable members of the opposition party. And to the extent that norms or other factors dictate that at least some share of those federal outlays over which the presidents exercises control goes to members of the opposition party, presidents have strong incentives to ensure it goes to members from electorally secure districts, for whom the aid will not have a decisive effect on the results from the next election.
It is an empirical question whether presidents end up directing more outlays to the opposition party than to their own; or whether presidents target outlays to specific members of either party in ways that are consistent with models of vetoes, vote buying, or strategic assistance. In the tests that follow, we examine all of these possibilities. Extending and refining Bickers and Stein's (1991; 1995) With 21 years of data for 435 districts, our total sample includes 9,135 observations. To reflect the fact that money spent this year is based on the budget passed last year, we match outlays in year t to the legislator who represented the district in year t -1. After decennial redistrictings, such matches are not possible, and hence we drop these cases, leaving us with a total of 7,882 observations to analyze.
The FAADS data include a great deal of federal spending by broad-based entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicaid, the distributions of which are determined by 3 We dropped all observations from 1983 because this was the last year before the 1980s redistricting took effect. Observations from 1983 are in different boundaries from, and therefore not comparable with, observations from any other year. formula. It hardly seems appropriate to attribute this kind of spending to the efforts of the president or other agenda-setters. To separate broad-based entitlement programs from federal programs that represent discretionary spending, we adopt a tactic used by Snyder (1995, 1997) . Specifically, we calculate coefficients of variation in district-level spending for each program contained in the FAADS data and use the coefficients to separate programs into two categories: low variation programs have coefficients of variation less than 3/4, and high variation programs have coefficients of variation greater than or equal to 3/4. Because these high variation programs should be especially susceptible to political manipulation, we focus on them in the main analyses that follow.
We do not argue that affiliation with the president is the sole determinant of the flow of federal funds to a district. Indeed, an obvious concern with any attempt to isolate the effect of politics on distributive spending is that there are many other attributes of districts-both observable and unobservable to the analyst-that influence the receipt of federal outlays. To control for such district-level factors, we use a differences-in-differences approach based on 5 The results presented in later pages are not sensitive to changes in the coefficient of variation cutoff. We experimented with four coefficient-of-variation thresholds greater than 3/4, none of which produced notably different results. Details are provided in the Appendix. district and year fixed effects. Moreover, because district boundaries change twice, following the two decennial redistrictings that occur during our study period, we use redistricting-specific fixed effects, for a total of 1,305 (435 × 3) fixed effects.
More formally, we specify the following basic model: ln(outlays it ) = β 0 + α i + δ t + β 1 P it + ψX it + ε it where subscript i denotes congressional districts and t denotes time. The main variable of interest is P it , which is a dummy variable equal to one if the district's representative is of the same party as the president. We include dummies for all but one year, δ t , to control for secular changes in federal domestic spending over time. The vector X it denotes other legislator characteristics, explained below. We account for all observable and unobservable, time-invariant district characteristics by including α i , which are redistricting-specific congressional district fixed effects. β 1 and ψ are regression coefficients, β 0 is a constant, and ε it is an error term.
This model specification allows us to ask whether a district receives more federal spending during the years in which its representative is a member of the president's party.
Identification in our models comes from two sources of within-district, within-redistricting period variation. First, holding the identity of the president constant, a district may change its affiliation with the president when it elects a new representative. For instance, a district may replace its Republican representative with a Democrat, which we predict should increase its receipt of federal outlays if the president is also a Democrat. Second, holding the identity of district's representative constant, the district's alignment with the White House may change with the election of a new president. For example, we would predict that Republican-represented districts will see increases in federal aid when a Democratic president is replaced by a Republican president. Within the data, we find substantial evidence of both kinds of variation. In addition to partisan considerations, presidents may also focus on electoral ones. Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) show that presidents are more likely to campaign for midterm Senate candidates in states where the president runs strongly and where the race is competitive. Updating that analysis, Sellers and Denton (2006) document that presidents campaign in states with competitive Senate races, with more electoral votes, and those where the president won a larger share of the vote in the last election. More directly, Larcinese et al. (2006) show that presidents direct more federal spending to states where they won more of the popular vote. Turning to House elections, Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus (2004) similarly find that Bill Clinton was most likely to campaign in districts with electorally vulnerable, Democratic incumbents. To allow for the possibility that districts in swing states will be lavished with federal projects, we therefore control for the state-level vote margin in the preceding presidential election.
We include a variety of covariates that are specific to each congressional representative.
We first identify actors whom the prior literature suggests should do well in the budgetary process: committee chairs, party leaders, members of the majority party, and members of the prestigious Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. We include a dummy variable for representatives elected in close races (less than 5% victory margin) to control for the possibility that electorally vulnerable members receive priority in discretionary spending (Stein and Bickers 1995) . To control for the possibility that inexperience or lack of seniority impede a member's ability to secure program benefits, we include a dummy variable for representatives in their first 19 term. Finally, as previous studies have shown that Democrats bring home more federal spending than Republicans, we control for the member's party affiliation (Alvarez and Saving 1997b) . Notice that our model does not explicitly control for district-level demographics.
Because district demographics are only measured once within a redistricting period-in the decennial census-we do not observe variation over time within-redistricting periods.
Therefore, the redistricting-specific district fixed effects subsume decennial census variables.
Given that we are not primarily concerned with estimating relationships between demographics and federal spending, the fixed effects specification appropriately identifies the effects of political variables purged of time-invariant district-level attributes.
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The fixed effects also capture any time-invariant state-level factors that influence federal spending, such as advantages or disadvantages due to malapportionment in the Senate (Lee 1998) .
Finally, even with a broad set of control variables, the unobservable, time-variant predictors of federal spending within a particular district are likely to be correlated across time periods. And the geographic distribution of federal spending also may reflect the effects of Senators as well as the quality and effort of House members, suggesting that there may be correlation across districts within a state. We therefore use robust standard errors clustered by state in all of our models. A random effects specification would allow us to estimate the effects of district-level demographics. However, Hausman tests reject random effects in favor of fixed effects in all our models (p < .001).
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Proper estimation of standard errors in panel data models is a topic that has received substantial attention over the past few years. Wooldridge (2006) provides a useful review of the issue and estimation techniques. Peterson (2007) provides extensive simulation results comparing different techniques, which favors the use of clustered standard errors for panel data. We have tried several different methods for calculating standard errors and found clustering to be the most conservative approach for our data (i.e., producing the largest standard errors). We also recognize that individual legislator characteristics, rather than congressional district characteristics, present another potential source of dependence in the observations (see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007) . Clustering by individual legislators does not change the statistical significance of our results appreciably, nor does clustering by congressional district. Table 1 presents the results of our fixed effects models of high-variation program spending. In model (1), we include a dummy variable for members of the president's party with no other control variables except for the year and district fixed effects. This simple model indicates that a district receives about 4 percent more federal spending when its representative is in the same party as the president. In model (2) we add dummy variables indicating other actors who may have influence in the budgetary process: committee chairs, ranking minority members of committees, party leaders, members of the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees, and members of the majority party. The effect of the president's party remains virtually unchanged, while none of the additional variables demonstrates a statistically significant effect on distributive spending. We will have more to say about some of these null results below.
In model (3) we introduce additional legislator attributes that may influence federal spending. We find that representatives who were elected in close races receive about 8 percent more federal spending, consistent with the notion that members of Congress direct resources to their more vulnerable colleagues. Members receive about 3 percent less spending in their first term, suggesting that inexperience or lack of seniority are disadvantages in the budgetary process.
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The coefficients for several additional control variables carry the expected signs but fall short of statistical significance. Consistent with Levitt and Snyder (1995) , we find that Republicans deliver fewer federal dollars to their districts, a finding, though statistically insignificant, that may reflect conservative distaste for federal programs or an entrenched Democratic advantage in programmatic politics. Note that this result is distinct from whether 8 We explored more complex ways of measuring the relationship between seniority and spending. Aside from the first-year deficit, we did not find that additional terms in office were associated with additional district spending. one is in the majority or minority. Membership in the majority party has no discernable effect.
Finally, we observe that districts in swing states-where the presidential vote margin was closer -receive more federal spending, though here again the effect is insignificant statistically.
Including a full set of committee membership dummy variables, as we do in model (4), does not notably alter our estimates for any of the control variables. Moreover, the estimated 5 percent advantage for members of the president's party appears unaffected by the additional committee membership indicators. With districts receiving, on average, $549 million each year in high-variation program spending, the estimated 5 percent reward for the president's copartisans typically amounts to about $27 million annually per district, or roughly $50 per capita.
Finally, to confirm that the results we observe in Table 1 reflect a general pattern of presidential influence, rather than the idiosyncratic efforts of a particular president, we reran versions of models (3) and (4) sequentially dropping one president at a time (not reported). The estimated coefficients for the presidential spending advantage were significant in every case and we could not reject the hypothesis that they were equal across the models. Thus, our results are not being driven by any particular president. Rather, they reflect a general pattern across all the administrations in our study period.
Targeting Presidential Benefits?
The evidence presented in Table 1 provides strong support for our central hypothesis: that members of the president's party will be advantaged in the contest for distributive benefits. In our theoretical discussion, we also suggested several ancillary hypotheses related to the more narrow targeting of benefits to specific members of either the president's own party or the opposition. Table 2 presents tests of these hypotheses by estimating a series of models in which the presidential dummy variable is interacted with other variables of interest. To conserve space, 22 we only report coefficients for the primary variables of interest, although the full set of control variables used above is included in all of the models in Table 2 . First, in model (1) we test the hypothesis from that the presidential spending advantage will shrink as the size of the president's party increases. To do so, we interact the presidential dummy variable with a variable measuring the size of the member's party. 9 The interaction term is positive and highly significant, which appears to run contrary to McCarty's predictions. Meanwhile, the main effect of party size is negative, suggesting that members of the opposition party obtain fewer benefits per district when their party is larger. We note, though, that this party size effect and its interaction with the president's party indicator are quite sensitive to model specification, and disappear when using different functional forms for party size, such as taking the logarithm.
Second, we hypothesized that the president may engage in vote-buying, with the implication that moderates in the opposition party would receive more federal program spending.
To test this hypothesis, we use each member's distance from the House median voter, measured in terms first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, as an indicator of the probability that the member's vote could be pivotal, making her a potential target for vote buying. In model (2) of Table 2 , we estimate the interaction between our presidential dummy variable and the member's distance from the median voter. This allows the distance from the median voter to have a different slope with respect to spending for members of the president's party and members of the opposition. Neither the main effect of the distance measure nor its interaction with the presidential dummy is significant, indicating that moderate members do not obtain more spending and that the effect is no different for members of the president's party relative to the opposition.
In model (3) we investigate the possibility that the president will differentially target benefits to electorally vulnerable members of his own party, but to electorally secure members of the opposition party. To do so, we interact the presidential dummy variable with the dummy indicating whether the member was elected in a close race. The close race dummy remains highly significant and positive, but the interaction term is nowhere near significant. In other words, electorally vulnerable members of the both the president's party and the opposition receive significantly greater federal program spending. Finally, in model (4) we use the freshman dummy variable as an additional indicator of vulnerability, and again we find no evidence of a differential effect for members of the president's party. Table 2 , the coefficient for the presidential main effect hardly changed at all. To facilitate the interpretation of these results, we mean-deviated the two continuous interacting variables-distance from the House median voter and party size-so that the reported coefficient for the presidential dummy variable can be interpreted as the presidential effect for a member with the average value of the interacting value. For the two dummy interaction variables-close elections and freshman-the presidential coefficient reflects the effect of being in the president's party for members not in close elections or their first term, respectively. In all cases, the estimated presidential main effect is roughly 5 percent.
It bears emphasizing that with the introduction of various interactions in

Robustness Checks and Extensions
The results presented in the preceding section demonstrate that a district receives more federal funding when its representative comes from the president's party. Meanwhile, we found little support for the two main competing theories of institutional influence in distributive politics, namely those pertaining to committees and the majority party. In this section, we 24 explore the sensitivity of both our positive and null findings. To conserve space, we do not report additional tables in this section but all results are available on request.
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Ideology versus Party
Our first robustness check contrasts the effects of presidential partisanship with ideological factors. While the literature does not provide much guidance on how the ideological locations of legislators might influence the flow of benefits to their districts, we allow for several possibilities, focusing on members' proximity to prominent actors in the budgetary process.
Using first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, we measure each member's distance from the chamber's median voter, to allow for the possibility that members who are more likely to cast decisive votes will be able to extract programmatic benefits for their districts. Next, we measure the distance of each member from the median member of the majority party, capturing the possibility that the dominant party rewards members whose voting patterns reflect the party's platform. Finally, we assess whether loyalty to one's own party, regardless of majority status, attracts more district funds. We measure party allegiance using two variables: the member's distance from the median own-party NOMINATE score; and the standard party unity score, which measures the percentage of times a member votes with her party when the parties are divided.
None of the four additional measures demonstrated much influence.
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There is weak evidence that members who tow the party line secure more federal outlays: ideological closeness to the own party median voter and party unity scores are both positively associated with spending, but neither relationship is statistically significant. Ideological distance from the chamber's median voter was positively, though insignificantly, associated with spending.
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For review purposes, we have included all the additional tables in a for-referees-only Appendix.
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Referees, please see Table R1 .
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Distance from the majority median voter was negatively associated with spending, though again the effect was small and statistically insignificant. More importantly, even after controlling for these various measures of ideology, our estimates of presidential influence are essentially unchanged at roughly 5 percent.
Policy Specific Effects
Our preceding analysis did not reveal significant effects of committee assignments on aggregate district spending. The literature on congressional committees, however, also emphasizes the influence of members over the specific programs under the direct control of their committees. While we have no specific hypotheses about which programs the president will seek to influence, we do want to give the competing theories a fair shake. We therefore explore the influence of committee membership on spending from programs under the committee's purview.
In four policy domains, we were able to separate the annual district-level spending sums by originating agency. We then matched the spending patterns of each agency to the primary committees that oversee it. We focus on four agencies: the Department of Health and Human Services (which accounts for 25 percent of all high variation spending during our period of study), the Department of Agriculture (23 percent), the Department of Transportation (14 percent), and the Department of Education (14 percent). Scholars generally agree that "pork barrel" considerations, which are so common in the standard view of distributive politics in Congress, are especially prevalent in these four policy domains. As before, we limit the analysis to high variation programs where legislators are in a position to influence spending flows to their districts.
Even after matching spending from specific agencies to the committees that govern them, we do not find compelling results for committee membership.
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When we reprise our main 12 Referees, please see Table R2. 26 specification for each of these three policy areas, including indicators for whether the legislator is a member of the relevant committee of jurisdiction, we do find that committee members overseeing agriculture, public works, and health policy obtain more spending in their particular jurisdictions, but the results are not significant. The null result for public works spending is especially surprising to advocates of the traditional distributive model, since this is the area often thought of as most amenable to pork barrel politics (e.g. Ferejohn 1974) . If true, then it would appear unlikely that repeating this analysis for other committees such as Judiciary or Banking would yield any more evidence in favor of committee influence. Meanwhile, members of the president's party receive between 6 and 12 percent more spending in each of the policy domains, and the estimated effects are statistically significant in education and health care.
If we exclude the fixed effects from the estimating procedure, we find significant results for committee membership in three of the four models: members of the Agriculture committee appear to get more spending from agriculture programs, and members of Appropriations and Ways and Means obtain more spending from both the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. The difference between the fixed effects and the OLS results is telling, as it suggests that members of the relevant committees do secure more (in the cross-section) from the expected programs, but that they also secured more before and after serving on the committee.
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This fact helps explain why some earlier research that relied heavily on cross-sectional data or short time series found sporadic evidence for committee effects, and we do not. Prior studies could not isolate the direction of causation, that is, whether membership 13 We also estimated random effects (RE) models and found significant effects of membership on the Agriculture committee. As noted earlier, though, RE assumes that the unobservable district-level effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. When this assumption is satisfied, RE estimates will be consistent and efficient whereas FE estimates will be inefficient (though still consistent). However, when the assumption is violated, as a Hausman test (not shown) indicates is the case here, RE estimates will be inconsistent. Regardless, it is worth noting that the estimated effects of membership in the president's party remain significant even when (inappropriately) using OLS or RE. 27 on the Agriculture committee allows a representative to secure more agriculture spending, or whether representatives who demand more agriculture spending sort onto the agriculture committee. Our results support the latter contention.
We do not claim, however, that our findings demonstrate that committee membership confers no benefits whatsoever. The fact that we do not find evidence of committee effects on the distribution of federal outlays does rule out the possibility that committee members exert disproportionate influence over other aspects of the policy-making process in their jurisdictions -such as, the probability that certain kinds of bills receive a vote or the types of bureaucratic oversight that occur. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that key decisions about the distribution of spending occurs primarily at the subcommittee rather than committee level.
Finally, we recognize the possibility that there is not enough within-district variation in committee membership to allow its effects to be precisely estimated in our fixed effects model.
For example, whereas we have nearly 1,000 cases of within-district change in partisan alignment with the president, we have only 180 cases of within-district change in membership on the Agriculture Committee.
Defense Spending
Though otherwise comprehensive in scope, the FAADS data omits defense spending. To examine whether our main findings are sensitive to its exclusion, we re-estimate our main models on an entirely different dataset that includes defense spending: the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), which the federal government releases on an annual basis. The CFFR contains information on military spending and government procurement, information not available in FAADS. Scholars of distributive politics, however, generally prefer FAADS because it provides greater detail on the recipients of government aid and their geography (see Bickers and Stein 1990) . In any case, our basic result stands using either data set. The presidential spending advantage is 4 percent when we use the CFFR data, and remains significant at the 1 percent level.
14 At the same time, the majority party effect becomes significant (p < 0.05) when using the CFFR data, and remains comparable in magnitude to the effect obtained using the FAADS data, at roughly 3 percent. Stein and Bickers (1995) argue that voters reward politicians for the number of projects delivered to their district rather than the aggregate level of funding. While we believe that outlays measured in dollars more closely reflect the theories of distributive politics that we are attempting to test, we have also run our models on the number of program awards as a robustness check. Specifically, using Bickers and Stein's data on the number of total awards and the number of newly enacted awards by district from 1984 to 1997 as the dependent variable, we replicated model (3) from Table 1 .
Number of Awards versus Spending
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The presidential effect is positive in both cases, with results suggesting that members of the president's party receive between 5 and 7 percent more program awards, although the effects fall short of statistical significance, possibly because of the smaller sample size in these models. We also found that members of the majority party, ranking committee members, Republicans, and freshmen all received significantly fewer total awards, though none of these effects are significant in models that focus on newly enacted awards, and none of the other variables in either model demonstrated a significant effect.
Universalism
In the face of null findings for several prominent theories of distributive politics, one may wonder whether program spending is, instead, universalistic, with a roughly equal share going to 14 Referees, please see model (1) of Table R3 . 15 Referees, please see models (2) and (3) of Table R3. 29 each member. Universalism is a popular explanation for both how Congress operates on its own (Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast 1979) and for how presidents try to influence goings on within it (Fitts and Inman 1992; Inman 1993) . Universalism thus deserves our consideration as an alternative to our empirical findings.
To gauge the extent of geographic variation in spending during the time period under consideration, we disaggregated the data by year and calculated some basic descriptive statistics.
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The 75th percentile district receives on average twice as much spending from highvariation programs as the 25th percentile. The standard deviation of spending is nearly equal to the mean in every year. Moreover, we note that in 15 of the 21 years in our period of study there are some districts that receive zero spending from new programs, which would appear to contradict the most basic "something for everyone" notion of universalism.
The Missing Majority
Throughout our analyses, we found mixed evidence that members of the majority party have an advantage in securing spending from federal programs. Though the effects are almost always positive, they only attain statistical significance in the model using CFFR data. While not the central question of this paper, the weak findings for majority status are surprising in light of past research that emphasizes the influence of party cartels in Congress on budgetary outcomes (e.g., Kiewiet and McCubbins 1993) . As a final robustness exercise, we investigated whether specific members of the majority party experience a spending advantage. More exactly, we estimated a series of models in which the majority party dummy variable was interacted with distance from the House median voter and electoral vulnerability, measured either by the close election dummy or the freshman dummy.
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The majority party dummy variable remained 16 Referees, please see Table R4 . 17 Referees, please see Table R5. 30 positive in every case, but never attained statistical significance. Among the interaction effects, only that with the freshmen dummy yielded a statistically significant effect, though the sign is perverse, as it suggests that freshmen in the majority receive significantly less than do freshmen in the minority, all else equal. However, this relationship is significant only at the 10 percent level. On the whole, then, we uncovered no evidence that moderates or electorally vulnerable members in the majority received more federal benefits.
By all indications there is considerable variation to be explained in the distribution of federal benefits across districts. Models that focus on the majority party simply do not appear to do a good job of it. The influence of majority party status, instead, may lie elsewhere, affecting such things as: which bills are voted on, what policies are subject to congressional hearings, the content of symbolic or moral legislation, how campaign funds are distributed, and how internal legislative resources are allocated (e.g., Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox and Magar 1999; McCubbins 2005, 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001; Smith 2000) .
Conclusion
To this point, conventional wisdom has dictated that all legislators wish to divert federal spending to their districts, and that certain party and committee leaders are better equipped to do so. If true, then members in the majority party as well as those who hold party and committee leadership positions should secure a disproportionate share of federal benefits. The empirical basis for these claims, though, remains weak. Most studies are plagued by data limitations that make it difficult to generalize across committees or to separate majority party membership from partisan affiliation; and virtually all ignore the basic fact that the president, rather than any member of Congress, retains primary proposal power over the federal budget.
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Analyzing a comprehensive database of domestic federal spending, we show that members of the president's party receive systematically more federal outlays than do members of the opposition party. In addition, districts where a legislator or states where the president narrowly won their last elections secure more funds. Districts represented by freshmen, meanwhile, tend to receive less federal spending.
Importantly, we find mixed evidence that members of the majority party obtain more federal outlays, and no evidence that committee assignments, party leadership positions, or other institutional positions of power bestow an advantage in the geographic distribution of federal spending. These factors may be important in affecting such things as roll call votes and the lawmaking process more generally. In shaping distributive politics, however, the president appears to predominate. is the natural log of district-level funding from high-variation federal programs. Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects, as well as all the control variables reported in table 1 (not shown). Close election is a dummy variable equal to one if the representative's victory margin in the preceding election was less than 5 percent. First term is a dummy variable equal to one for representatives in their first term. Distance from the house median voter and party size are both centered (i.e., mean-deviated) so the main effect for the president's party in these models can be interpreted as the effect at the average value of these variables. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
APPENDIX TABLES FOR REVIEWERS ONLY
This Appendix contains the results of additional analyses discussed in the text. To conserve space, we do not envision publishing these tables should the article be accepted. However, we include them here to give reviewers full access to all of the model results discussed in the paper. Should the editor or reviewers prefer that we publish the attached tables, we are of course happy to do so. We would also be open to posting them on-line for interested readers. 0.059 0.057 0.123 0.079 The dependent variable in each column is the natural log of district-level funding from high-variation federal programs administered by the named agency. Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (1) is the natural log of district-level funding from high-variation federal programs contained in the CFFR; in model (2) is the number of federal awards contained in FAADS; in model (3) is the number of new awards contained in FAADS. Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 is the natural log of district-level funding from high-variation federal programs. Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects, as well as all the control variables reported in table 1 (not shown). The president's party dummy variable is excluded from model (1). Close election is a dummy variable equal to one if the representative's victory margin in the preceding election was less than 5 percent. First term is a dummy variable equal to one for representatives in their first term. Distance from the house median voter and distance from ownparty median voter are both centered (i.e., mean-deviated) so the main effect for the majority party in these models can be interpreted as the effect at the average value of these variables. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
